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ED O’BANNON v. NCAA: DO FORMER NCAA ATHLETES HAVE A 
CASE AGAINST THE NCAA FOR ITS USE OF THEIR LIKENESSES? 
INTRODUCTION 
Tim Tebow, former quarterback for the Florida Gators1 and the first 
sophomore to win the Heisman Trophy,2 was arguably the most popular 
college athlete of 2009.3  Accordingly, any merchandise with his jersey 
number is a top seller for the University of Florida and its authorized 
merchants.4  Licensed collegiate merchandise is a multi-billion dollar industry5 
that provides a significant revenue stream for the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) and its member universities.6  Consumer demand for a 
university’s merchandise is heavily influenced by the success of its athletic 
programs.7  For example, Lousiana State University’s merchandise royalties 
 
 1. Tim Tebow, UNIV. OF FLA. ATHLETICS GATORZONE, http://www.gatorzone.com/foot 
ball/misc.php?p=tebow/bio (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Ben Volin, Tebow Surprised by Ad Backlash, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 28, 2010, at 1C 
(characterizing Tim Tebow as “one of the most popular college athletes of all time”); see also 
Peter Kerasotis, The Tebow Effect: A Look into the Phenomenon of Florida’s Quarterback, FLA. 
TODAY, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1A (“No player in college football history has been more scrutinized, 
more written about, more filmed, more photographed, more celebrated or had more spotlights 
shined his way than Tebow has.”); Danny O’Neil, The Tim Tebow Show: This is Tim Tebow, 
Cultural Icon.  A Phenomenon Even.  To Call Florida’s Quarterback a Rock Star Doesn’t Quite 
Capture It.  He is a Beatle in Cleats, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 2010, at C1 (characterizing Tim 
Tebow as a cultural icon). 
 4. See Jeremy Fowler, Tim Tebow’s Return Good for Gators Economics, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL BLOGS (Jan. 16, 2009, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.orlandosentinel.com/sports_college_uf/ 
2009/01/tim-tebows-retu.html (providing retail manager’s statement that apparel labeled with 
Tim Tebow’s jersey number “15” is flying off the shelves). 
 5. Retailers, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/ 
Content/retailers.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (“It is estimated that more than 50,000 stores 
across the U.S. carry collegiate product and generate an estimated $3.5 billion in collegiate 
licensed retail sales.”). 
 6. Joey Johnston, Sports Generate Millions of Dollars for UF, TAMPA TRIB. (June 5, 2009), 
http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/jun/05/sports-make-millions-dollars-uf/ (noting that licensing 
and marketing was a top revenue stream for the University of Florida’s athletic department, which 
generated more than $106 million in revenue during the 2007–2008 fiscal year). 
 7. Id. (“The Gators’ college football national championships in 2006 and 2008 . . . created 
windfalls from merchandise sales . . . UF’s merchandise sales and licensing income enjoyed a 
$4.1 million spike after the 2006 football title.”). 
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nearly tripled after it won its first Bowl Championship Series title in 2003.8  
Although student-athletes play a large role in the success of collegiate athletic 
programs, the universities—not the student-athletes—cash in on the profits.9  
Universities also capitalize on the popularity of individual players,10 some of 
whom gain national recognition and celebrity status.11  Despite the revenues 
and profits universities derive from the acclaim of star players, the NCAA 
prohibits student-athletes from receiving any of the financial benefits derived 
from their fame or the use of their likenesses.12 
Some former student-athletes decided that this prohibition was not only 
unfair, but also illegal.  On May 5, 2009, Sam Keller, former starting 
quarterback for the Arizona State University and University of Nebraska 
football teams, filed a class action lawsuit in the Northern District of California 
against the NCAA, the Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC), and Electronic 
Arts for the use of student-athletes’ likenesses in video games.13  In June 2009, 
Ryan Hart, a former Rutgers University quarterback, brought a similar action 
in New Jersey state court.14  One month later, Ed O’Bannon, who led the 
University of California-Los Angeles Bruins to the 1995 NCAA basketball 
tournament championship, filed another class action lawsuit in the Northern 
District of California against the NCAA and the CLC, its business partner, for 
their use of athletes’ likenesses in various products.15 
 
 8. See Chris Gautreau, LSU, Vendors Cash in on Win, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Jan. 
9, 2008, at 1D (noting LSU’s share of NCAA merchandise royalties rose to almost $3 million for 
2003–2004 from just $962,000 in 2002–2003). 
 9. See Wayne T. Price, The Gator Stimulus, FLA. TODAY, Jan. 7, 2009, at 8C (noting the 
University of Florida collects 10% royalty fees on wholesale sales of standard Gator products and 
12% royalty fees on Gator championship products). 
 10. Vladimir P. Belo, Note, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away With 
Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 134 (1996) (“The 
universities have begun licensing products that seek to capitalize on the popularity of actual 
players in addition to the popularity of the schools and their athletic teams.”). 
 11. See Kerasotis, supra note 3, at 1A (discussing the fame and notoriety of the University of 
Florida’s quarterback, Tim Tebow); see also Berry Tramel, BCS National Championship: The 
Rock Star QB’s – OU’s Sam Bradford vs. Florida’s Tim Tebow, NEWSOK (Jan. 7, 2009), 
http://newsok.com/rock-star-qbs-bradford-vs.-tebow/article/3335858?custom_click=lead_story 
_title (discussing Tim Tebow’s rock star status). 
 12. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N., 2009–2010 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 
12.5.2.1 (2009), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-division-
i-manual.aspx [hereinafter NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL]. 
 13. Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1079 
(N.D. Cal. May 5, 2009) (No. CV 09-1967) [hereinafter Keller Complaint]. 
 14. Jennifer Golson, Former Rutgers, N.Y. Jets Quarterback Suing Videogame Maker for 
Using Likeness, N.J REAL-TIME NEWS (June 30, 2009, 7:41 PM), http://www.nj.com/news/ 
index.ssf/2009/06/former_rutgers_ny_jets_quarter.html. 
 15. Class Action Complaint at 2, 10, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19170 
(N.D. Cal. July 9, 2009) (No. CV 09-3329) [hereinafter O’Bannon Complaint]. 
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Keller, who brought suit on behalf of all NCAA student-athletes whose 
likenesses have been used without their permission, chose the right of 
publicity, a creature of state law, as one of the major legal theories of his 
case.16  O’Bannon, who represents former student-athletes, grounds his claim 
in antitrust law, arguing that the NCAA and its business partners illegally 
colluded to depress prices paid to former student-athletes.17  Both cases also 
claim unjust enrichment.18 
O’Bannon’s case has gained momentum in recent months.  In February 
2010, United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken denied the NCAA’s 
attempt to dismiss the lawsuit.19  Judge Wilken also combined O’Bannon’s 
case with Sam Keller’s.20  In March 2010, Ed O’Bannon received additional 
company as more former athletes, some of whom played as far back as the 
1960s, joined as plaintiffs in the class-action suit.21 
Previous scholars have projected the outcome of Keller’s lawsuit.22  
Likewise, the issue of unconscionability, which relates to O’Bannon’s 
allegations that the NCAA used duress and unfair bargaining tactics to coerce 
collegiate athletes into signing away their rights, has also been addressed in 
previous articles.23  O’Bannon’s antitrust claim as applied to former student-
athletes, however, has not been previously discussed in the scholarship. 
Professor Michael McCann has noted the high stakes of O’Bannon v. 
NCAA: 
If O’Bannon and former student-athletes . . . receive a favorable settlement, the 
NCAA, along with its member conferences and schools, could be required to 
pay tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, of dollars in damages—
particularly since damages are trebled under federal antitrust law.  The 
 
 16. Keller Complaint, supra note 13, at 2, 17–18. 
 17. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 2, 62–67. 
 18. Keller Complaint, supra note 13, at 20; O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 67. 
 19. ASSOCIATED PRESS, U.S. Federal Judge OK’s Former UCLA Player’s Lawsuit Against 
NCAA, 660 NEWS (Feb. 8, 2010), available at http://www.660news.com/sports/article/25130--u-
s-federal-judge-ok-s-former-ucla-player-s-lawsuit-against-ncaa. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Jon Solomon, Prothro Joins Class-Action Suit Against NCAA, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, 
Mar. 12, 2010, at 7C (noting a number of former athletes added their names to the suit, including 
former Alabama football star Tyrone Prothro; Alex Gilbert, who played with Larry Bird at 
Indiana State in 1979; Eric Riley, a member of the early 1990s “Fab Five” Michigan teams, and 
four players from Texas Western’s historic 1966 NCAA championship basketball team). 
 22. See Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, 
and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Summer 2009, at 1, 
23–31 (analyzing the issues of Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.). 
 23. See Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit 
Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 277 (2008) (arguing the NCAA agreement 
with student athletes constitutes an unconscionable adhesion contract). 
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marketplace for goods may change as well, with potentially more competition 
over the identities and likenesses of former college stars.24 
Additionally, a victory would drastically change the student-athlete experience, 
creating a more litigious environment for both student-athletes and athletic 
department officials.25 
This comment forecasts that O’Bannon’s antitrust claim will succeed and 
predicts the impact that a favorable judgment would have on the collegiate 
licensing market.  Part I provides an overview of the NCAA’s current practices 
with respect to its use of former athletes’ likenesses, Part II provides the details 
of O’Bannon’s complaint, and Part III discusses the law of antitrust and the 
history of antitrust cases brought against the NCAA.  Part IV analyzes 
O’Bannon’s antitrust claim, and Part V projects how licensed merchandise will 
be impacted by O’Bannon’s success.  The conclusion then estimates the 
magnitude of the damages that will be awarded and projects the impact on the 
collegiate merchandise and video game markets. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF THE NCAA’S PRACTICES AND ITS USE OF FORMER 
ATHLETES’ LIKENESSES 
A. NCAA Licensing Practices 
The NCAA sells and licenses a wide variety of products that contain the 
images of former NCAA athletesincluding DVDs of past championship 
games, replica jerseys, television broadcasts of “classic” NCAA games, and 
video games.26  The NCAA’s primary licensing partners include the CLC and 
Thought Equity Motion, Inc.27  CLC, a for-profit corporation,28 is a subsidiary 
of IMG Worldwide, Inc. (IMG).29  CLC oversees all licensing, marketing, and 
distribution of royalties for the NCAA.30  It also manages all of the rights for 
the more than 200 NCAA institutions that represent nearly an 85% share of the 
 
 24. Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust 
Case, SI.COM (July 22, 2009, 9:51 AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/michael_ 
mccann/07/21/ncaa/index.html. 
 25. Id. 
 26. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 4. 
 27. About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/ 
Content/aboutclc.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2010); NCAA Collection Overview, THOUGHT EQUITY 
MOTION, http://www.thoughtequity.com/video/home/article/ncaa.do (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 28. See About CLC, supra note 27. 
 29. See College Sports, IMG, http://www.imgworld.com/sports/college_sports/default.sps 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (describing CLC as IMG’s licensing agency). 
 30. Marcia Chambers, Sales of College Stars’ Jerseys Raise Ethics Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2004, at D1. 
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collegiate licensing market with over $4 billion in retail sales.31  Thought 
Equity Motion is also a for-profit corporation.32 
The NCAA and its member schools license college-themed video games 
featuring the images of former and current student athletes.33  The NCAA 
issued an exclusive license to Electronic Arts, permitting them to publish 
games such as NCAA Football and NCAA March Madness.34  Although these 
games do not use the names of any players, the images and statistics of the 
virtual players model their real-world counterparts so well that “even casual 
fans of college sports would recognize the athletes depicted in them.”35  The 
players in these games mimic the corresponding college athlete’s jersey, 
number, height, weight, skin tone, hair color, home state, and playing style.36  
Gamers “can download player rosters from other users via an online feature set 
up by Electronic Arts” that facilitates internet connectivity.37  Upon 
downloading these files, the names of the players are automatically displayed 
on the backs of the players’ jerseys.38  These games are sold for a price of 
$59.95 per unit.39 
 
 31. About CLC, supra note 27. 
 32. See About Thought Equity Motion, THOUGHT EQUITY MOTION, http://www.thought 
equity.com/video/shell/txp/about-us-home.do?title=About+Us (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  
Thought Equity Motion, Inc. markets itself as the “world leader in digitizing, delivering and 
monetizing high-quality video content. . . . The company’s media partners include . . . the NCAA 
. . . .”  Id. 
 33. Rodney McKissic, If It’s in the Game, It’s in the Game, BUFFALO NEWS BLOG (July 5, 
2009, 12:06 PM), http://blogs.buffalonews.com/campus/2009/07/if-its-in-the-game-its-in-the-
game.html; Julia Pine, Two Teams Featured in EA Sports Game, The 1990 Lions Picked as a 
Classic Team in NCAA Basketball 2009, L.A. LOYOLAN (Nov. 23, 2008) (noting NCAA 
Basketball 2009 features classic teams that utilize the likeness of former NCAA student-athletes), 
http://www.laloyolan.com/sports/two-lmu-teams-featured-in-ea-sports-game-1.930935. 
 34. McKissic, supra note 33. 
 35. Katie Thomas, College Stars See Themselves in Video Games, and Pause to Sue, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 4, 2009, at A1 (“In NCAA Football 2009, the quarterback for the University of 
Florida is left-handed, stands 6 feet 3 inches, and wears No. 15, just like the Gators’ Tim 
Tebow. . . . While the electronic player’s hometown is different—Tebow is from Jacksonville, 
not Brandon—each is from Florida.”).  See also Andy Latack, Quarterback Sneak: With Its 
College Football Video Game, EA Sports is Making an End Run Around the NCAA’s Rules, 
LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb. 2006, at 69 (stating gamers “don’t have to know a PlayStation from a train 
station” to recognize who the virtual players are intended to resemble). 
 36. Thomas, supra note 35 (noting EA’s 2005 edition of NCAA Football mimicked the 
playing style of former Arizona State quarterback, Sam Keller, a pocket passer, and noting EA’s 
virtual player shared Keller’s jersey number, height, weight, skin tone, hair color, and home 
state). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Electronic Arts EA Store, ELEC. ARTS, http://eastore.ea.com/store/ea/DisplayHome 
Page/ThemeID.718200 (search for “NCAA Basketball 09”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
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The NCAA also sells DVDs of championship games dating back to the 
1940s, featuring college athletes who graduated decades ago.40  These DVDs 
sell for between $24.95 and $150.00 each41 and feature a wide range of men’s 
and women’s sports, such as basketball, baseball, lacrosse, golf, water polo, ice 
hockey, and volleyball.42  Though currently only championship and playoff 
games are offered, the NCAA has expressly stated its intent to add regular 
season games to its collection of available DVDs, thereby escalating its use of 
former athletes’ images.43 
Additionally, photographs sold commercially feature the images of former 
student-athletes.  Replay Photos, LLC, operates the “Official Photo Site of 
National Collegiate Athletic Association,”44 which sells photographs of various 
championship games featuring former student-athletes.45  The Men’s Division 
I Basketball photos date back to the 1970s.46  The list of NCAA sports for 
which photos are available include basketball, baseball, football, golf, water 
polo, soccer, volleyball, and others.47 
Rebroadcasts of classic college football and basketball games on ESPN 
Classic also feature the images of former student-athletes.48  Likewise, replica 
jerseys featuring the numbers of former players are sold under agreements with 
 
 40. See 1962 Men’s Basketball DVDs, NCAA ON DEMAND, http://www.ncaaondemand.com 
(click on “Basketball” under “Men’s”; then click “years” to browse) (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) 
(offering DVD’s featuring championship basketball games from 1962 and other championship 
games of that decade). 
 41. See Men’s Basketball DVDs, NCAA ON DEMAND, http://www.ncaaondemand.com/ 
composite_sports/men-s-basketball (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 42. Browse by Sport, NCAA ON DEMAND, http://www.ncaaondemand.com/composite 
_sports (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  At least the following numbers of games are available in 
various Men’s sports: Basketball-2,494; Baseball-535, Football-507, Ice Hockey-214.  Id. 
 43. About Us, NCAA ON DEMAND, http://www.ncaaondemand.com/pages/about-us (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2010) (“NCAA On Demand will initially focus on NCAA championships, but will 
expand into the premier site for college athletics video with content from games and events from 
regular season and conference championships as well as unique content that has never been seen 
before.”). 
 44. NCAA Photo Store, REPLAY PHOTOS, http://www.replayphotos.com/ncaaphotostore/ 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 45. See, e.g., Arkansas Razorback Photos, REPLAY PHOTOS, http://www.replayphotos.com/ 
Arkansasphotos/basketball-m-pictures/_MBK___0001024.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (selling 
photos depicting athletes from the 1994 Men’s Basketball National Championship).  Framed 
photos start at $69.95 in price.  Id. 
 46. 1970–79 Pictures to Buy, REPLAY PHOTOS, http://www.replayphotos.com/ncaaphoto 
store/mens-division-i-pictures/basketball-1970-79_MD1_B_720_0001024.cfm (last visited Nov. 
4, 2010) (selling photos of Earvin (Magic) Johnson playing for Michigan State and Bill Walton 
playing for UCLA.  A custom framed photo starts at $69.95 in price). 
 47. Arkansas Razorback Photos, supra note 44. 
 48. See ESPN Classic, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/espntv/espnNetwork?networkID=18 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (“In addition, the network airs . . . legendary college football and 
basketball.”). 
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manufacturers and CLC,49 despite the ethical concerns of leading NCAA 
officers.50 
B. The NCAA Division I Bylaws 
The NCAA’s primary mission is to integrate intercollegiate athletics into 
higher education and promote student-athletes’ educational experiences.51  The 
NCAA bylaws are published in the NCAA Division I Manual.52  One of the 
NCAA’s core principles expressed therein is preserving amateurism and 
protecting student-athletes from exploitation by professional and commercial 
enterprises.53  The NCAA, therefore, prohibits student-athletes from receiving 
any remuneration in any form for their athletic skill in their respective sports.54  
It also prohibits athletes from accepting any promises of future remuneration to 
be received after graduation.55 
The NCAA does, however, permit limited use of the likenesses and images 
of student-athletes.56  NCAA-member universities, recognized entities thereof, 
and nonprofit agencies are permitted to “use a student-athlete’s name, picture, 
or appearance to support its charitable or educational activities,” provided, 
among other requirements, it is not used to promote commercial ventures of a 
non-profit agency.57  Additionally, the NCAA permits NCAA member 
universities to sell items with names, likenesses, or pictures of multiple 
student-athletes.58  However, “[i]tems that include an individual student-
athlete’s name, picture, or likeness (e.g., name on a jersey, name or likeness on 
a bobble-head doll) . . . may not be sold . . . .”59  Currently, the NCAA policy 
does not address the use of student-athletes’ likenesses in Electronic Arts’s 
 
 49. Chambers, supra note 30 (noting a replica jersey featuring the jersey number of Ben 
Gordon was on sale at the University of Connecticut bookstore for $49.99). 
 50. Id. (“Even Myles Brand, the president of the N.C.A.A., said he had ethical concerns 
about the marketing of star players’ numbers, although he ruled out permitting athletes to make 
money from the sale of replicas of their uniforms.”). 
 51. McCann, supra note 24.  See also NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 12, § 1.3.1. 
 52. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 12, at viii.  “The NCAA has three divisions: 
Division I, Division II and Division III; membership in a particular division depends on a variety 
of factors, including the number of sports the individual school offers, and whether athletic 
scholarships are available.”  Ray Yasser & Clay Fees, Attacking the NCAA’s Anti-Transfer Rules 
as Covenants not to Compete, 15 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 221, 223 (2005).  This 
comment will focus on Division I, which includes the major collegiate athletic powers.  See id. 
 53. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 12, § 2.9. 
 54. Id. § 12.1.2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., id. § 12.5.1.1. 
 57. Id. 
 58. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 12, § 12.5.1.1(h). 
 59. Id. 
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video games.60  Although the NCAA is aware of this loophole, it has yet to 
create new policy addressing this problem.61 
C. Form 08-3a – The Student-Athlete Statement 
In addition to requiring student-athletes to follow the bylaws enumerated 
in the NCAA Division I Manual, the NCAA requires Division I student-
athletes to sign a series of documents  in order to be eligible for intercollegiate 
athletic competition.62  Among these documents is Form 08-3a, which states, 
“You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g. 
host institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or 
picture to generally promote NCAA championships or other NCAA events, 
activities or programs.”63  The NCAA believes that, although not expressly 
stated in the form, this document forces “students-athletes [to] relinquish in 
perpetuity all rights in the NCAA’s licensing of their images and likenesses.”64 
II.  O’BANNON’S COMPLAINT 
Ed O’Bannon takes issue with nearly every use by the NCAA of former 
players’ images, including sales of DVDs featuring classic games, video clips 
sold to corporate advertisers, photo sales, video game sales, rebroadcasts of 
classic games, and sales of apparel.65  O’Bannon claims the NCAA and its 
business partners, most notably CLC, have conspired to artificially depress 
payments to former student-athletes for the use and sale of their likenesses to 
zero.66  He argues this agreement among the NCAA and its business partners 
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on trade because the anti-competitive 
 
 60. Kaburakis et al., supra note 22, at 15. 
[A] confirmation of the apparent loophole with respect to use of [student-athletes’] 
likenesses in video games is found in a staff interpretation from January 7, 2006.  Therein, 
the NCAA staff addressed a member institution question: Would this legislation preclude 
companies from using [a student-athlete’s] likeness in sports video games?  Sadly, the 
interpretation did not provide significant clarification, as it merely recited Bylaw 12.5.2.2. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. (noting NCAA governing bodies are attempting to find solutions to this loophole). 
 62. McCann, supra note 24. 
 63. Form 08-3a Academic Year 2008–09: NCAA Student-Athlete Statement–Division I, 
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (2008), http://www.ukathletics.com/doc_lib/compliance 
0809_sa_statement.pdf.  See also McCann, supra note 24. 
 64. McCann, supra note 24.  O’Bannon claims, however, that no reasonable person would 
understand this form “to specifically grant a license in perpetuity for former players’ images to be 
used for profit, over many years, in DVDs, on-demand video, video games, photographs for sale, 
‘stock footage’ sold to corporate advertisers, ‘classic games’ for re-broadcast television, jersey 
and apparel sales, and other items.”  O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 23–24. 
 65. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 37–58. 
 66. Id. at 61. 
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effects substantially outweigh the pro-competitive benefit of preserving 
amateurism.67 
O’Bannon also claims the NCAA’s receipt of royalties for its licensing 
practices constitutes unjust enrichment and requests an accounting of the 
licensing revenues that the NCAA and its business partners allegedly 
wrongfully diverted to themselves.68  His requested relief includes 
disgorgement of all profits earned via the allegedly wrongful use and sale of 
former student-athletes’ images plus interest, as well as a declaration that the 
NCAA’s existing licensing agreements for the use of former student-athletes’ 
images are void and unenforceable.69 
III.  ANTI-TRUST LAW AND THE HISTORY OF ANTI-TRUST CASES AGAINST THE 
NCAA 
A. A Recognizable Market 
According to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination 
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”70  While this broad language could be 
construed to include every contract,71 the United States Supreme Court has 
interpreted this statute to preclude only unreasonable restraints on trade.72  The 
challenged conduct must “restrain commercial competition in the marketing of 
goods or services” or restrain “trade or commerce” as recognized under 
Section 1.73  The plaintiff, therefore, must establish that a legally cognizable 
market exists for the restrained competition.74 
This requirement has frustrated previous antitrust claims against the 
NCAA, including the student-athlete’s claim in Jones v. NCAA, where Steven 
Jones sought to compete in Northeastern University’s intercollegiate ice 
hockey program.75  Jones was deemed ineligible by the NCAA because he had 
accepted compensation for playing hockey in an amateur league prior to his 
 
 67. Id. at 64. 
 68. Id. at 67–68. 
 69. Id. at 68–69. 
 70. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 71. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (noting that “every contract is a 
restraint of trade”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. In re NCAA 1-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148 (W.D. 
Wash. 2005) (citations omitted). 
 74. See id. at 1148, 1150 (“Normally, market definition is ‘essential’ to claims under § 1 . . . 
in which the rule of reason is applied.” (citation omitted)).  See also United States v. Brown 
Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 75. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303–04 (D. Mass. 1975). 
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matriculation.76  Jones claimed that by prohibiting his participation in 
collegiate competition, the NCAA unlawfully restrained trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.77  The district court noted, however, that Jones 
was not a “‘competitor’ within the contemplation of the antitrust laws” because 
the “competition” he sought to protect was on a hockey rink as part of an 
education program and thus had no “nexus to commercial or business 
activities.”78  Thus, no cognizable market existed for the competition Jones 
sought to protect, and therefore, his ban from competition was not a “restraint 
of trade.”79 
B. The Rule of Reason 
Where a cognizable market exists, the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant “(1) participated in an agreement that (2) unreasonably restrained 
trade in the relevant market.”80  In determining reasonableness, courts have 
weighed the anticompetitive effect of the restriction against the pro-
competitive justification.81  First, the plaintiff must show the challenged action 
has had an adverse effect on competition as a whole.82  If the plaintiff 
succeeds, the defendant then has the burden to establish sufficient pro-
competitive “redeeming virtues” of the action.83  If the defendant shows 
sufficient redeeming virtues, the plaintiff must show that the same pro-
competitive effect could be achieved through less restrictive means.84  This test 
has been called the rule of reason analysis.85  Courts evaluate the pro-
competitive and anti-competitive effects primarily from the consumer’s 
perspective.86 
 
 76. Id. at 296–98. 
 77. Id. at 303. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 81. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).  See also NCAA 
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (noting the Court must consider the NCAA’s pro-
competitive justifications for its restraint on the number of games a university can broadcast via 
network television). 
 82. Clorox Co., 117 F.3d at 56. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  (“Ultimately, the goal is to determine whether restrictions in an agreement among 
competitors potentially harm consumers.”); see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 107 (citing Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 
‘consumer welfare prescription.’”); SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 965 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (citing Stamatakis Indus., Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1992)) (“To be judged 
anticompetitive, the agreement must actually or potentially harm consumers.”). 
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The Supreme Court applied the rule of reason analysis in NCAA v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.87  In that case, two schools 
challenged the NCAA’s plan for televising college football games for the 
1982–1985 seasons.88  This plan limited the number of games that could be 
televised by individual member schools and established fees that member 
schools could charge.89  These fees differentiated only between national and 
regional broadcasts and did not vary with the size of the viewing audience, the 
particular characteristics of the game, or the participating teams.90 
In evaluating the anti-competitive effect, the Court noted that more games 
would be televised absent the NCAA’s plan.91  This output restriction raised 
the price charged to broadcasters for television rights and created a price 
structure that was “unresponsive to viewer demand.”92  In its defense, the 
NCAA argued that the plan maintained “a competitive balance among amateur 
athletic teams.”93  Although the Court acknowledged that NCAA’s member 
schools must cooperate to preserve competitive balance, it concluded that 
limiting the number of televised games did not serve the goal of equalizing the 
strength of competing teams.94  The Court also noted that the NCAA’s other 
restrictions on player eligibility already achieved the goal of preserving 
competitive balance, and therefore, alternative and less restrictive means 
existed.95  The Court ultimately held that the anti-competitive effect 
outweighed the pro-competitive justification and declared the NCAA’s plan to 
be a violation of antitrust law.96 
IV.  ANTI-TRUST LAW APPLIED TO THE NCAA’S USE OF THE LIKENESSES OF 
FORMER NCAA ATHLETES 
A. A Legally Cognizable Market for Licensing the Likenesses of Former 
NCAA Players 
O’Bannon can establish a recognizable market exists for the use of former 
student-athletes’ likenesses.97  The pending case is unlike Jones, where the 
 
 87. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88. 
 88. Id. at 91. 
 89. Id. at 92–93. 
 90. Id. at 93. 
 91. Id. at 104–05. 
 92. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 105 n.29, 106. 
 93. Id. at 117. 
 94. Id. at 117–18. 
 95. Id. at 119. 
 96. Id. at 119–20. 
 97. For examples of products in the market, see O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 10–
13. 
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district court held there was no legally cognizable market98 and Jones’s 
participation in intercollegiate athletics was not a commodity that could be 
traded in any recognizable marketplace.99  In this case, student-athletes’ 
images and likenesses are commodities that have market value, as evidenced 
by the commercial use of former student athletes’ images in video games, sales 
of replica jerseys featuring the numbers of former star players, and 
photographs of former student-athletes.100  Thus, the market for licensing the 
images and likenesses of former student-athletes is already well-established, 
and therefore, prohibiting former student-athletes from negotiating and 
entering their own contracts for the use of their images and likenesses 
constitutes restraint of trade.101 
B. Is the Restraint on Trade Reasonable? 
To present a successful claim, O’Bannon must show that this “restraint of 
trade” is unreasonable.102  O’Bannon must, therefore, demonstrate that the anti-
competitive effects of prohibiting former student-athletes from licensing their 
images and likenesses outweigh the pro-competitive justifications.103 
1. The Anti-competitive Effects of Restricting Former Players’ Rights to 
Their Likenesses 
With respect to the market for video games, Professor Michael McCann 
has posited that permitting former athletes to license their images may benefit 
consumers.104  Under the current licensing regime, only video publishers with 
strong financial resources are able to bid on the publicity rights covering the 
entire NCAA, limiting the number of potential bidders to only a handful.105  If 
the NCAA’s restriction on former players’ abilities to license their images was 
stricken, more former athletes would negotiate individual licensing deals after 
college.106  If college athletes could license their own images after graduation, 
 
 98. Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (1975). 
 99. See id. (“The ‘competition’ which the plaintiff seeks to protect does not originate in the 
marketplace or as a sector of the economy but in the hockey rink as part of the educational 
program of a major university.”). 
 100. See supra Part I.A. 
 101. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 98 (“There can be no doubt that the challenged practices 
of the NCAA [limiting the number of games an NCAA university can televise] constitute a 
‘restraint of trade’ in the sense that they limit members’ freedom to negotiate and enter into their 
own television contracts.”). 
 102. Id. (noting the Sherman Act only prohibits “unreasonable restraints of trade”). 
 103. See supra notes 80–86 and accompanying text. 
 104. McCann, supra note 24. 
 105. See id.; Lirin Offir, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Gaming Industry Awoke to 
Realize that Electronic Arts was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 91, 111 (2006). 
 106. McCann, supra note 24. 
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more licenses would be sold, increasing supply, and theoretically, creating a 
more competitive market for those licenses.107  “Permitting former athletes to 
negotiate their own deals,” “multiple video game publishers could publish 
games featuring ex-players.”108  Competition among video game publishers 
could “enhance technological innovation and lower prices for video game 
consumers.”109 
While increased competition among video game publishers is possible, it is 
not inevitable.  Video game publishers seek group licenses because the games 
feature an entire team of players, rather than just a few individuals.110  
Permitting former college athletes to license their likenesses would likely 
compel the creation of a commercial entity with the authority to grant group 
licenses on behalf of all former college athletes and facilitate video game 
publishers’ demand for group licenses.111  Such an entity would be a “one-stop 
shop” for video game publishers and would model the entities of the 
professional athletic associations that facilitate group licensing for active and 
retired professional athletes.112 
This group licensing entity would likely offer former student-athletes 
tiered rates of compensation for the use of their likenesses.113  Players would 
fall into tiered categories according to their level of popularity, which in turn 
would hinge on their amount of playing time during their collegiate career and 
level of skill as perceived by fans.114  This collegiate licensing group would 
make take-it-or-leave-it offers to former players based on their respective 
popularity tier.  Some players would likely opt out of such agreements, either 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. EA negotiates exclusive group licenses with professional athletes for its video games 
featuring NFL teams.  See Tim Surrette & Curt Feldman, Big Deal: EA and NFL Ink Exclusive 
Rights to Licensing Agreement, GAMESPOT (Dec. 13, 2004, 2:53 PM), http://www.game 
spot.com/news/2004/12/13/news_6114977.html (discussing EA’s exclusive group license with 
the NFL Players, Inc.). 
 111. Kaburakis, supra note 22, at 33. 
 112. Keven J. Davis & Pamela R. Lester, Exclusivity in Endorsement Contracts—The 
Athlete’s View, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ENTERTAINMENT, ARTS, AND SPORTS LAW, 
JANUARY 25–27, 2007 (Am. Law Inst. & Am. Bar Ass’n 2007) (“All of the major league team 
sports have group licensing programs for active players.”).  See also Parrish v. Nat’l Football 
League Players, Inc., No. C07-00943(WHA), 2007 WL 1624601, at *1, *2 (N.D. Cal. 2007) 
(explaining the National Football League Players Association has an arm that “negotiates and 
facilitates group licensing and marketing opportunities for active and some retired NFL players”). 
 113. NCAA member universities are offered tiered rates for the use of their trademark items 
in EA’s video games.  Andrew Carter, Colleges Profit From Video Game’s Success, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 2006, at D1. 
 114. This outcome would be similar to the NCAA’s current licensing agreement with NCAA 
member universities, which are categorized into royalty tiers based on the success of each 
school’s real-world athletic program.  Id. 
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believing they could obtain a better offer on their own or refusing to license 
their image at any price.115  One theory posits that there would still be an 
opportunity for other video game publishers to acquire licenses from former 
players who refrain from participating in the group license, leaving open the 
possibility for increased competition among video game publishers, as 
Professor McCann has projected.116 
This theory, however, fails to consider that such licenses from former 
players are not worth much without a complementary license from the NCAA.  
Video game publishers seek to illustrate former players in their collegiate 
uniforms, which display their respective school’s name and logo.117  These are 
trademarked items that belong to the schools themselves, not to the former 
student-athletes.118  If former players were permitted to license the rights to 
their likenesses, publishers would need two licenses: one from the NCAA for 
the use of the school’s name, jersey, and logo, and another from the former 
student-athlete for the use of his or her likeness.  Video game publishers with 
strong financial resources, such as Electronic Arts,119 would still be able to 
negotiate exclusive rights for a license from the NCAA and from any entity 
created to negotiate group licenses for former players.120  This negotiating 
power would effectively preserve Electronic Arts’s monopoly over the use of 
former athletes’ images in video games, since competitors who acquire rights 
from former players not participating in an exclusive group license would only 
be able to display the individual former player without his or her school jersey. 
 
 115. This is exactly what has happened in professional sports with Major League Baseball, 
where, for example, Barry Bonds has refused to participate in any group licensing.  See Darren 
Rovell, Bonds Will Be Individually Licensed, ESPN.COM (Nov. 27, 2003, 12:09 AM), 
http//:sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=1661883. 
 116. See supra notes 10409 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 23, at 247 (noting EA’s NCAA March Madness 
“depicts stadiums, school uniforms, [and] mascots . . . with remarkable accuracy”). 
 118. See, e.g., Razorback Licensing and Trademark Guidelines, 
ARKANSASRAZORBACKS.COM, http://www.arkansasrazorbacks.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OE 
M_ID=6100 &ATCLID=212438 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 119. See About Us, ELEC. ARTS, http://aboutus.ea.com/home.action (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) 
(“In fiscal 2010, EA had 27 titles that sold more than one million copies, and five titles that each 
sold more than four million copies . . .”  EA also has 8,000 employees worldwide as of March 31, 
2010). 
 120. Electronic Arts has done exactly this with the NCAA already.  See Carter, supra note 
113.  Additionally, Electronic Arts would likely negotiate an exclusive group license with the 
licensing arm representing former student-athletes, as Electronic Arts has done exactly this for its 
Madden NFL product, negotiating an exclusive license with the NFL Players Association that 
endures until 2012.  Tor Thorsen, EA Sports Extends NFL Deal through 2012 Season, 
GAMESPOT (Feb. 12, 2008, 6:15 AM), http://www.gamespot.com/news/6185880.html?tag=other-
user-related-content%3B1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] ED O’BANNON v. NCAA 383 
The complementary relationship between the former players’ rights to their 
likenesses and the NCAA’s remaining rights to university logos and jerseys 
would likewise inhibit increased competition in the replica jersey market.  
Even if former student-athletes were permitted to individually license their 
likenesses, enabling jersey manufacturers to place the name of the former 
student-athlete on the jersey, manufacturers would still need a license from the 
NCAA to replicate the university’s jersey with its name and logo.  
Competition, therefore, would still be limited to jersey manufacturers that 
negotiate a license agreement with the NCAA, leaving the ultimate output 
unaffected. 
While restricting former athletes’ rights to their likenesses has no impact to 
consumers, O’Bannon asserts that it certainly has an anti-competitive effect on 
producers or former student-athletes.121  Absent the NCAA’s current ban, 
former athletes would inarguably receive higher royalties for the use of their 
images than they currently receive.122  The NCAA’s licensing practice, 
therefore, has the anti-competitive effect of transferring wealth from former 
college athletes to the NCAA.123  Although this smacks of unfairness, the 
NCAA’s policy transfers wealth from producers to the NCAA, not from 
consumers to producers.  The purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect 
consumers, not producers.124  From the consumer’s perspective, the anti-
competitive effect is minimal: The NCAA would still be able to limit 
competition due to the complementary relationship between the former 
student-athletes’ rights to their likenesses and the NCAA’s remaining rights to 
university logos and jerseys. 
Limiting competition, however, is only one type of anti-competitive effect 
on consumers.  Another anti-competitive effect is the diminution of the quality 
of products available to consumers,125 an effect that certainly results from the 
NCAA’s current practices.  The NCAA’s policy diminishes the quality of 
replica jerseys and video games because video publishers and jersey 
manufacturers are prohibited from featuring the names of the individual 
athletes in their products.126  This policy diminishes the realism of the product 
 
 121. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 64. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See id. at 63–64. 
 124. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 125. Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways Plc., 257 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[O]ur precedents suggest that whether an actual adverse effect has occurred is determined by 
examining factors like reduced output, increased prices and decreased quality.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 126. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.  In the case of video games, although after-
market downloads are available to add player names on the jerseys, Thomas, supra note 35, at 
A3, this step would be unnecessary if the NCAA did not require that student-athletes relinquish 
their rights in perpetuity. 
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available to the consumer, thereby diminishing its quality.  By showing this 
anti-competitive effect, O’Bannon would likely carry his “initial burden of 
showing that the challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on 
competition as a whole . . . .”127  The burden would then shift to the NCAA to 
establish the “pro-competitive ‘redeeming virtues’” of its policy.128 
2. Consideration of Pro-competitive Justifications for Current NCAA 
Licensing Practices 
Courts have recognized preserving amateurism as a pro-competitive effect 
of prohibiting student-athlete compensation and as a primary justification for 
the NCAA’s licensing practices.129  This justification in the O’Bannon case, 
however, would be far less persuasive, as former student-athletes are no longer 
members of amateur athletic teams under the NCAA’s control.  Although the 
prospect of future remunerative endeavors may impact athletes while they are 
still enrolled as students, particularly during the twilight of their collegiate 
careers,130 the creation of group licensing entities to negotiate with licensees 
and the former student-athletes would marginalize such pressures.  Upon 
graduation, a former student-athlete’s decision to participate in a group 
licensing agreement would be limited to accepting or rejecting the licensing 
entity’s take-it-or-leave-it offer.131  Alternatively, such pressures imposed by 
future remunerative endeavors already exist to some degree and are caused by 
the prospects of participating in major league drafts and playing at the 
professional level thereafter.132  Enabling student-athletes to collect royalties 
for the continued use of their likenesses, therefore, would not further 
compromise amateurism. 
Other pro-competitive arguments are likewise weak.  The NCAA will 
argue its current licensing policy promotes competitive balance.133  Its analysis 
will likely proceed as follows: Strong NCAA teams are more likely to generate 
 
 127. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis in 
original). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Garry R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 
2658–61 (1996).  See also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (noting that not 
paying student-athletes is necessary to preserve the “character and quality of the ‘product’” that is 
amateur sports and to preserve the distinction between collegiate and minor league athletics). 
 130. McCann, supra note 24 (projecting that such prospects may lead to exploitation by 
unsavory business persons). 
 131. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 132. See Rachel Bachman, Her Influence Knows No Bounds, THE OREGONIAN, Jan. 23, 2005, 
at D1 (noting the pressure college athletes face when turning pro, as evidenced by college football 
players leaving school to attend pre-NFL draft workouts, and by women’s basketball players 
preferring playing on professional teams overseas than graduating from college). 
 133. The NCAA has argued this defense in previous antitrust litigation.  Bd. of Regents, 468 
U.S. at 118. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] ED O’BANNON v. NCAA 385 
publicity for student-athletes than weak or mediocre teams, due to the larger 
crowds and increased media exposure garnered by strong teams.134  Permitting 
future student-athletes to profit from the use of their images after graduation 
would reinforce student-athletes’ incentives to play for strong teams due to this 
increased exposure.  This dynamic would strengthen athletic programs that are 
currently successful and hinder athletic programs that are currently weak, 
ultimately compromising the competitive balance among NCAA member 
schools. 
This analysis, however, is flawed.  Although currently strong teams 
generate more publicity for the team as a whole,135 they do not necessarily 
generate more publicity for each individual student-athlete.  Mediocre players 
on strong teams are eclipsed by the star-studded starting line-up, and they 
would receive more playing time and more exposure if they were to play for a 
weaker team.  This reality undermines the argument that student-athletes’ 
incentives to play for a weak team would be diminished.  Alternatively, the 
competitive balance the NCAA seeks to preserve has already been 
compromised by the NCAA’s current rules and regulations.136  Teams that 
historically produce far more wins than losses regularly defeat teams with less 
impressive historical win-loss records by large margins.137  Current NCAA 
rules and practices, moreover, appear to be ineffective to enable schools with 
weak athletic programs to improve their relative performance from year to 
year.138  Given this existing lack of competitive balance, jurors will not likely 
 
 134. Strong teams receive greater publicity and media coverage due, in part, to their regular 
appearances in tournaments and championship games.  For example, The University of Florida’s 
men’s football team has appeared in a bowl game nearly every season over the last twenty years.  
Florida Bowl History, COLL. FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/ 
div_ia/sec/florida/bowl_history.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  Conversely, Vanderbilt’s football 
team has appeared in only four bowl games since 1955.  Vanderbilt Bowl History, COLL. 
FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/div_ia/sec/vanderbilt/bowl_ 
history.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Roberts, supra note 129, at 2665. 
 137. Id.  For example, the University of Florida’s football team (Florida Gators) has defeated 
the Kentucky Wildcats every year since 1987.  Florida vs Kentucky, COLL. FOOTBALL DATA 
WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/div_ia/sec/florida/opponents_records.php?team 
id=1628 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  Additionally, the Gators have defeated the Vanderbilt 
Commodores every year since 1992. Florida vs Vanderbilt, COLL. FOOTBALL DATA 
WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/div_ia/sec/florida/opponents_records.php?team 
id=3363 (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 138. Roberts, supra note 129, at 2665.  For example, Duke University’s football team has 
been the perennial doormat of the ACC, not producing a winning season since 1994.  Duke Yearly 
Totals, COLL. FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/div_ia/acc/ 
duke/yearly_totals.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2010).  Likewise, Vanderbilt University’s 7–6 record 
during the 2008 season is its only winning season since 1982.  Vanderbilt Yearly Totals, COLL. 
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be persuaded that “any one of the NCAA’s rules, or even its rules as a whole,” 
promote competitive balance.139 
Permitting former student-athletes to license their likenesses may actually 
improve the NCAA’s core productthe games played in the real-world arenas.  
Current student-athletes, motivated by the prospect of earning a higher 
licensing fee after graduation, may increase their efforts on the practice field in 
an attempt to earn more playing time during games.  This dynamic ultimately 
would elevate the performance level on the playing field and improve the 
entertainment value delivered to consumers. 
3. Balancing the Pro-competitive Effects Against the Anti-competitive 
Effects 
Restricting former student-athletes’ rights to their own likenesses has the 
anti-competitive effect of diminishing the quality of products available to 
consumers.140  Conversely, limiting the class of plaintiffs to former student-
athletes who no longer compete in collegiate sports undermines the NCAA’s 
classic defensepreserving amateurism.141  Strong evidence of current 
competitive imbalance likewise undermines the NCAA’s argument that its 
restriction preserves competitive balance.142  Accordingly, the trial court will 
likely hold that the anti-competitive effects outweigh the pro-competitive 
effects and will strike the NCAA’s prohibition against former student-athletes 
receiving remuneration for use of their likenesses.  This victory, however, 
would not entitle O’Bannon to all of his requested relief, which includes 
royalties for sales of far more than video games and replica jerseys.143 
V.  THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT FOR O’BANNON 
The O’Bannon complaint takes issue with nearly every product featuring 
the image or likeness of any former student-athlete, including the sales of 
DVDs of past NCAA games,144 video clips to corporate advertisers,145 photos 
featuring former student-athletes,146 action figures, trading cards, posters,147 
video games,148 jerseys, t-shirts and apparel,149 and television rebroadcasts of 
 
FOOTBALL DATA WAREHOUSE, http://cfbdatawarehouse.com/data/div_ia/sec/vanderbilt/yearly_ 
totals.php (last visited Nov. 4, 2010). 
 139. Roberts, supra note 129, at 2667. 
 140. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 141. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra Part II. 
 144. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 38–41. 
 145. Id. at 41–44. 
 146. Id. at 44–45. 
 147. Id. at 46–47. 
 148. Id. at 47–54. 
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classic games.150  O’Bannon’s legal team would have the court believe that 
every product featuring the use of a former athlete’s image appropriates his or 
her right of publicity.  However, this assertion contradicts prior case law. 
A. Right of Publicity Case Law 
Not all uses of another’s name are tortious.  In CBC Distribution and 
Marketing, Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, the court addressed whether CBC’s 
use of Major League Baseball players’ names and playing records in fantasy 
baseball sports products violated the players’ rights of publicity.151  “Fantasy 
games allow fans to draft a personal ‘dream team’ of players that earns points 
based on the real performances of chosen players.”152  CBC’s customers would 
play the role of managers and owners of fictitious teams created for a fantasy 
season.153  Customers would select players for their teams from a list of Major 
League Baseball players.154  The success of a customer’s team over the course 
of a fantasy season would depend on the chosen players’ real-life performances 
on their real-life major league teams.155  Advanced Media and the Players’ 
Association alleged that this use of players’ names and playing records 
amounted to a violation of their publicity rights.156 
“[T]he elements of a right of publicity action include: (1) That defendant 
used plaintiff’s name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and 
with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage.”157  Factors relevant to 
determining whether a public personality’s name is used as a symbol of his or 
her identity include “the nature and extent of the identifying characteristics 
used by the defendant, the defendant’s intent, the fame of the plaintiff, 
evidence of actual identification made by third persons, and surveys or other 
evidence indicating the perceptions of the audience.”158  Additionally, how the 
players’ names are used, rather than the mere fact that they are used, is 
significant.159 
 
 149. O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 15, at 56–58. 
 150. Id. at 54–56. 
 151. CBC Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 
1082–83 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 152. William E. Kirwin & R. Gerald Turner, Tackling Fantasy Leagues, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 
2008, at A31. 
 153. CBC, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 1084. 
 157. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995)). 
 158. Id. at 370 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995)). 
 159. See id. at 369. 
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In CBC, the court noted the use of baseball players’ names and playing 
records did not involve the character, personality, or reputation of the 
players.160  The court, therefore, held CBC’s use of players’ names, in 
conjunction with the players’ playing records, did not involve the persona or 
identity of any player.161 
Turning to the commercial advantage element, the CBC Court held that 
CBC’s fantasy games did not suggest “that any Major League baseball player 
[was] associated with CBC’s games or that any player endors[ed] or 
sponsor[ed] the games in any way.”162  The court inferred that CBC was not 
using the players’ identities to publicize their product because their names and 
athletic statistics were necessary elements of CBC’s product.163 
Although there is no bright-line rule to determine exactly what constitutes 
appropriation of another’s likeness, courts have exercised prudence in 
protecting celebrities’ personas and examine whether the casual observer 
would associate the defendant’s protested image with the plaintiff.164  In 
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., former major league baseball all-star and 
Brooklyn Dodgers great, Don Newcombe sued Coors alleging that its 
magazine advertisement appropriated his right of publicity.165  Coors admitted 
the drawing in the advertisement, which featured a pitcher in the wind-up 
position, was “based on a newspaper photograph of Newcombe pitching in the 
1949 World Series.”166  The pitcher was faceless, however, and Newcombe’s 
number had been changed from 36 to 39.167  Likewise, the bill of the hat in the 
drawing was a different color from Newcombe’s hat in the photograph.168  
Nonetheless, the court noted the stance of the faceless pitcher strongly 
resembled Newcombe’s signature stance, and that the skin color of the faceless 
pitcher was similar to Newcombe’s skin color.169  The court also observed that, 
although the second digit of the uniform number in the advertisement was 
inverted, it was still similar enough to Newcombe’s actual number to conjure 
images of Newcombe “either consciously or subconsciously.”170  The court, 
 
 160. CBC, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 1086. 
 163. Id. (noting that all fantasy game providers use names and playing records by necessity). 
 164. Michael Gerton, Note, Kids’ Play: Examining the Impact of the CBC Distribution 
Decision on College Fantasy Sports, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 153, 161 (2009).  See also 
Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692–93 (9th Cir. 1998) (comparing the 
proportions, shape, skin color, and other details of the alleged infringing advertisement image 
with that of the plaintiff). 
 165. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689. 
 166. Id. at 690. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 692–93. 
 170. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. 
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therefore, determined that even absent the express use of Newcombe’s name 
and the omission of his facial features in the drawing, a reasonable juror could 
still find the advertisement appropriated Newcombe’s likeness.171 
B. Right of Publicity Law Applied to O’Bannon’s Claims 
Applying these legal precepts to O’Bannon’s claims, the sale of several 
products featuring the images of former student-athletes would be unaffected 
by a favorable judgment for O’Bannon because they do not misappropriate 
former student-athletes’ rights of publicity.  For example, the NCAA’s use of 
former student-athletes’ images in the sale of DVDs and television 
rebroadcasts featuring “classic games” is similar to CBC’s use of player names 
in that neither use involves the character, personality, or reputation of the 
players.172  Video showing the former student-athletes playing basketball does 
not suggest that any player endorsed or sponsored the games.  The NCAA is 
not marketing the image of any particular player but rather the actions of a 
group of players (e.g., playing basketball).  The NCAA, therefore, is not using 
the student-athletes’ individual images for commercial advantage.  DVDs and 
television broadcasts of classic games feature the game itself and the athletic 
performances of the players; the use of the players’ names and visual images is 
a necessary, incidental element of those games.173  The sale of DVDs and 
rebroadcasts of “classic games,” therefore, does not misappropriate former 
student-athletes’ rights of publicity. 
A ruling that the NCAA’s restrictions violate antitrust law would, 
however, have some impact on the collegiate photography market, which 
includes photos of collegiate basketball games, teams, and players.174  Some of 
the photos sold contain images of a single former player, often one who has 
gained notoriety playing at the professional level.175  These photos 
misappropriate the former player’s right of publicity because their 
marketability depends heavily on the fame and notoriety of the individual 
player, his or her reputation, character, and personality.  These photos, 
therefore, use the former player’s name and image as a symbol of his or her 
identity with the intent of gaining a commercial advantage. 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. CBC Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 
1086 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 173. Use of a player’s image must be more than incidental to violate the right of publicity.  Id. 
at 1085 n.9 (citing Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 375 (Mo. 2003)). 
 174. See NCAA Photo Store, supra note 44. 
 175. See, e.g., 1970–79 Pictures to Buy, supra note 46 (selling photos of NBA greats such as 
Magic Johnson and Bill Walton playing for Michigan State and ULCA, respectively). 
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Conversely, many of the photos sold capture images of multiple players on 
the court during game time,176 and the sale of these photos would not violate 
the former players’ publicity rights because they feature the athletic event 
itself, rather than the images of the players as symbols of their identities.  
Team photos, likewise, would not violate former players’ publicity rights.  
Although the inclusion of star former athletes of particular notoriety in these 
photos may motivate consumers’ purchases, the primary focus of the photo—at 
least from an objective perspective—is the team as a whole, not any single 
former player. 
Analyzing the sale of replica jerseys yields a conclusion similar to that 
regarding photographs featuring individual athletes.  Although NCAA bylaws 
prohibit labeling merchandise with players’ names,177 universities and retailers 
know that consumers associate the jersey numbers of star student-athletes with 
the personas and identities of the athletes themselves.178  Television networks 
broadcast images of collegiate athletes in their jerseys—which clearly illustrate 
their numbers—to fans nationwide, enabling fans to attach identity meaning to 
their jersey numbers.179  Retailers, therefore, substitute the player’s name with 
his or her jersey number in attempt to use the star student-athlete’s persona and 
popularity for “commercial advantage.”180  Although there is no bright-line 
rule indicating to what degree the student-athlete must be identifiable from the 
alleged likeness,181 the high sales volumes of merchandise labeled with the 
 
 176. See, e.g., Sasha Kaun, REPLAY PHOTOS, http://www.replayphotos.com/ncaaphotostore/ 
mens-division-i-print/sasha-kaun_33063.cfm (last visited Nov. 4, 2010) (selling photo of 
Kansas’s Sasha Kaun dunking over Memphis’s Antonio Anderson, Joey Dorsey, and Chris 
Douglas-Roberts during the first half of the championship game at the NCAA college basketball 
Final Four, Monday, Apr. 7, 2008). 
 177. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 12, § 12.5.1.1(g). 
 178. See, Fowler, supra note 4 (retail manager noting her employer’s business receives 
requests for “Tim Tebow” stuff labeled with the number “15”); see also Chambers, supra note 30 
(characterizing the substitution of jersey numbers for names as “meaningful”); Hanlon & Yasser, 
supra note 23, at 267 (discussing the inextricable link between a star player’s jersey and his or her 
identity). 
 179. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 23, at 267.  Hanlon and Yasser persuasively note that: 
Jersey numbers differentiate players.  The greatest players are occasionally honored by 
having their jersey number retired as ‘a symbolic gesture’ providing that no other player 
will ever wear a particular number again.  This act memorializes the player’s identity with 
that specific team and jersey number.  There is no doubt that placing a star player’s 
number on a jersey for sale enhances its popularity, demand and, consequently, its value.  
While it may be true that people purchase college sports merchandise simply because of 
the school or athletic team, it cannot be overlooked that merchandise featuring star-
players’ jersey numbers are best-selling items. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 180. See Fowler, supra note 4 (retail manager noting his employer “put #15 on things and 
they will sell really well”).  See also Hanlon and Yasser, supra note 23, at 267. 
 181. See Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 692 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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jersey numbers of popular athletes182 is evidence that consumers “readily 
identify” student-athletes from their jersey numbers.183  This actual recognition 
in the minds of consumers proves that a jersey number represents a star 
athlete’s persona.  Moreover, the Newcombe Court believed the jersey number 
of the faceless pitcher in Coors’ advertisement (“39”) could conjure images of 
Newcombe even though the second digit of Newcombe’s number (“36”) was 
inverted.184  If a similar but different jersey number could conjure images of 
the real-world athlete, an exact match of the player’s jersey number would 
certainly do the same.  Affixing a jersey number to merchandise sold in 
commerce, therefore, could constitute appropriation of the student-athlete’s 
likeness.185  Sales of replica jerseys of former student-athletes would therefore 
be prohibited without the former student-athletes’ expressed permission. 
The use of former student-athletes’ images in video games would also 
violate publicity rights.  Although these games do not use the names of any 
players, the physical appearances, statistics, and playing styles of the virtual 
players model their real-world counterparts so well that gamers “don’t have to 
know a PlayStation from a train station” to recognize who the players are 
intended to resemble.186  In Newcombe v. Adolf Coors, omitting the face of the 
pitcher, changing Newcombe’s number from “36” to “39,” and omitting the 
pitcher’s name was not enough to escape liability because a rational jury could 
find that Newcombe was “readily identifiable.”187  Here, game makers have 
done even less to disconnect the virtual players from their real-world 
counterparts, omitting only their names and copying everything else, even the 
student-athletes’ hairstyles and signature accessories, such as arm sleeves.188  
Similar to Newcombe, student-athletes are “readily identifiable” by their skin 
tone, jersey number, and playing style, and therefore, the video games 
 
 182. See Fowler, supra note 4 (retail manager noting that apparel labeled with Tim Tebow’s 
jersey number “15” are flying off the shelves). 
 183. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(b)(1) (West 2009) (providing that, for photos, “[a] person 
shall be deemed readily identifiable from a photograph when one who views the photograph with 
the naked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted in the photograph is the same 
person who is complaining of its unauthorized use.”).  By analogy, athletes are “readily 
identifiable” from their jersey numbers when consumers can reasonably determine who the 
number and team illustrated on the jersey represent. 
 184. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. 
 185. See id. at 692 (holding that if the pitcher in the advertisement was readily identifiable as 
Newcombe, then a jury could reasonably find that Newcombe’s likeness had been appropriated). 
 186. Latack, supra note 35, at 69; see also Thomas, supra note 35 (“[E]ven casual fans of 
college sports would recognize the athletes depicted in [the video games].”). 
 187. Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 693. 
 188. Brian Chistopherson, Football Players Sue NCAA, EA, LINCOLN J. STAR, May 8, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://msn.foxsports.com/cbk/story/Football-players-sue-NCAA,-EA (noting 
that a K-State player wearing No. 1 in an EA video game wears an arm sleeve just like the real-
world counterpart did). 
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appropriate their likenesses.  Further, video publishers use these likenesses for 
“commercial advantage” because they are intended to add realism and 
authenticity to the game, distinguishing Electronic Arts’s product from those of 
competitors.  Additionally, consumers would likely presume the players are 
endorsing or sponsoring the game because using their images is not a 
necessary element of the game—video game publishers could use fictitious 
characters to create fictitious games.189  Should O’Bannon’s antitrust claim 
succeed, Electronic Arts would no longer be able to use former student-
athletes’ images without licenses from the former student-athletes. 
Of all the merchandise with which O’Bannon takes issue, a court will 
likely issue an injunction only for the NCAA’s licensure of replica jerseys, 
photos featuring solo shots of former student-athletes, and video games that 
copy former student-athletes’ likenesses.  O’Bannon cannot stop the NCAA’s 
licensure of “classic game” broadcasts, group photos, or its sale of DVDs 
because the inclusion of a former student-athlete’s image in such products is a 
necessary, incidental element of the product that does not involve the 
character, persona, or reputation of the student-athlete.190 
CONCLUSION 
O’Bannon will likely establish that the NCAA’s restriction of former 
athletes’ licensing their likenesses for pay violates antitrust law due to the lack 
of pro-competitive effects achieved by this restriction, and the attenuated 
connection between imposing restrictions on former student-athletes and 
preserving amateurism.  If O’Bannon prevails on his antitrust claim, Defendant 
CLC191 will likely develop a subsidiary exclusively dedicated to negotiating 
group licenses for former NCAA players and make take-it-or-leave-it offers to 
former student-athletes for the use of their likenesses in Electronic Arts’s video 
games, the use of their names on replica jerseys, and the use of their images in 
solo photographs.  Some star former student-athletes will likely refrain from 
appearing in video games or on replica jerseys.192  The result for consumers 
will be mostly positive, as they will no longer need to download rosters from 
third parties to enable the names of players to be displayed in the video games, 
and their replica jerseys will be more authentic. 
 
 189. This hint of sponsorship distinguishes this case from CBC, where the court held CBC’s 
use of the player’s statistics did not suggest an association between the players and CBC’s games 
because CBC’s use of those statistics was a necessary element of its product.  CBC Distribution 
& Mktg., Inc. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1086 (E.D. Mo. 2006). 
 190. See id. at 1086–89 (holding that incidental use contradicts use for commercial advantage 
and that use not involving character, personality, or reputation contradicts use of identity). 
 191. NCAA’s primary business partner.  See supra Part I.A. 
 192. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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A favorable result for O’Bannon, however, will not result in sweeping 
changes to the college-themed video game market, in light of the 
complementary nature between the former-student athletes’ images and the 
collegiate jerseys.  The trademark rights for the school jerseys belong to the 
NCAA and its member institutions, and Electronic Arts can negotiate an 
exclusive license for the use of the jersey designs, effectively preserving its 
monopoly.  The market for college sports-themed video games would more 
closely resemble that for professional sports-themed games, where video 
publishers create monopolies by negotiating exclusive group licenses.193  
Likewise, a favorable judgment for O’Bannon will not entitle him to all of his 
requested relief.  The NCAA’s licensure of “classic game” broadcasts, group 
photos, and sales of DVDs featuring former student-athletes will continue 
unabated.194 
Although courts award treble damages for antitrust violations,195 the 
NCAA’s member institutions are philanthropic entities striving to educate the 
minds of tomorrow, an admirable objective.  A nine-figure verdict for former 
college-athletes would impose an enormous burden on the NCAA and its 
member schools, resulting in university budget cuts and higher tuition bills that 
would ultimately impact students.  The philanthropic purpose of these member 
universities and the ultimate side effects on the students would likely elicit 
sympathy from jurors.  Accordingly, jurors will likely find a reason to limit the 
prejudgment damages and interest damages to a figure reasonably affordable 
by the NCAA and its member institutions. 
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